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Abstract. Recently, the security of multimodal verification has become a grow-
ing concern since many fusion systems have been known to be easily deceived 
by partial spoof attacks, i.e. only a subset of modalities is spoofed. In this paper, 
we verify such a vulnerability and propose to use two representation-based met-
rics to close this gap. Firstly, we use the collaborative representation fidelity with 
non-target subjects to measure the affinity of a query sample to the claimed client. 
We further consider sparse coding as a competing comparison among the client 
and the non-target subjects, and hence explore two sparsity-based measures for 
recognition. Last, we select the representation-based measure, and assemble its 
score and the affinity score of each modality to train a support vector machine 
classifier. Our experimental results on a chimeric multimodal database with face 
and ear traits demonstrate that in both regular verification and partial spoof at-
tacks, the proposed method significantly outperforms the well-known fusion 
methods with conventional measure. 
Keywords: Multimodal Verification, Spoof Attacks, Representation-based 
Measure, Support Vector Machine. 
1 Introduction  
A generic biometric system has eight vulnerable points that can be exploited by an 
intruder to gain unauthorized access [1]. Among them, spoof attacks usually present a 
counterfeited biometric sample (e.g., a gummy fingerprint, a face image/video/mask) 
to a system sensor, which do not require knowledge about the system’s operational 
mechanism and internal parameters. Spoof attacks are also known as non-zero effort 
attacks, presentation attacks, and direct attacks. The concept of non-zero effort attacks 
is relative to zero effort attempts, where an imposter doesn’t fabricate the biometric 
trait of any specific client and merely presents his/her own biometric trait to the system. 
In the literature, an imposter is generally regarded as an intruder who performs zero 
effort attempts. In this paper, for clarity and terminological consistence, a legitimate 
claim, zero effort attempt, and non-zero effort attack are termed as genuine, imposter 
and spoof, respectively, together with their associated executor/sample/score. 
Multimodal systems have been considered intrinsically more secure than unimodal 
systems based on the intuition that an intruder would have to spoof all the biometric 
traits to successfully impersonate the targeted client [2]. Such a belief has long been 
established disregarding the possibility that an intruder is falsely accepted by spoofing 
only a subset of the biometric traits. The vulnerability of multimodal systems to partial 
spoof attacks has been shown in the worst-case scenario, where the intruder is assumed 
to be able to replicate a subset of the biometric traits of a genuine client exactly. Under 
this assumption, Rodrigues [3] showed experimental results on chimeric multimodal 
databases with face and fingerprint that multimodal systems can be deceived easily by 
spoofing only a subset of the modalities, if the fusion rule is not designed with any anti-
spoofing measure. Wild et al. [4] showed the sensitivity of multimodal systems to par-
tial spoof attacks with real fake biometric databases. 
Some efforts to enhance the security of multimodal systems against partial spoof 
attacks have already been reported. Rodrigues et al. [5] proposed a modification of the 
classic likelihood ratio (LLR) method that considers the possibility of spoof attacks and 
the degree of security to individual trait when modelling score distributions. However, 
these prior probabilities are application dependent and may not be time invariant, hence 
are quite difficult to quantify. Rodrigues et al. [3] also proposed the idea of using quality 
measures to protect against spoof attacks. Intuitively, a fake biometric sample is likely 
to be of inferior quality. However, biometric quality assessment is still an open issue to 
most biometrics. Besides, fake biometric sample is not necessarily to be inferior with 
the emerging image/video synthesis, 3D printing, and materials. 
Liveness detection is another kind of approach used to improve the spoofing re-
sistance for a given system. Marasco et al. [6] proposed a multimodal system that in-
corporates a liveness detection algorithm to reject spoofed samples. If a spoof attempt 
is indicated, the related modality matching score is ignored. Wild et al. [4] combined 
the recognition score and liveness measure at score level with a 1-median filtering 
scheme for enhanced tolerance to spoof attacks. Nevertheless, neither one of hardware-
based and software-based liveness detection systems have shown acceptable perfor-
mance and cost against spoof attacks. Physiological and behavioral characteristics are 
also employed to enhance multimodal verification security in [7]. 
This paper is enlightened by the fact that in a partial spoof attack, the recognition 
scores achieved from non-spoofed modalities are generally near the imposter score dis-
tribution center, given that they are also zero effort attempts from a unimodal view-
point. Unlike the quality- and/or liveness-based methods that focus on the spoofed mo-
dalities, we propose to take advantage of non-spoofed modalities. To this end, we put 
forward a representation-based measure to gauge the affinity of a query sample to a 
claimed client. This is based on the assumption that a biometric sample would result in 
inferior sparse representation fidelity if it doesn’t lie in any subspace spanned by the 
samples from the same subject [8-10]. Note that, it is unlikely to exhaustively collect 
the representative samples per subject to construct a class specific overcomplete dic-
tionary. We propose to build the dictionary together with samples from non-target sub-
jects to collaboratively represent a query sample.  
This affinity score could be an additional measure to a traditional verification 
method. However, we further consider sparse coding as a one-to-many comparison 
 among the claimed client and non-target subjects, and hence explore other sparsity-
based metrics for verification. We evaluate two measures, namely, sparse coding error 
(SCE) and sparse contribution rate (SCR), on a multimodal database with face and ear. 
Encouraging performance of SCE-based and SCR-based sum fusion methods evidently 
supports the usage of sparsity-based one-to-many comparisons in multimodal verifica-
tion. However, SCR shows much more inferior performance in spoof attacks. Last, we 
assemble the proposed affinity score and SCE score of each modality as an input vector 
to train a support vector machine (SVM) classifier.  
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we construct a chimeric mul-
timodal database with face and ear traits. The proposed method is compared with the 
well-known multimodal methods like LLR, SVM, and Sum fusion that are based on 
cosine similarity. The experimental results validate that in both no spoof and partial 
spoof cases, the proposed method significantly outperforms its competitors. For exam-
ple, the traditional methods get the best equal error rates (EER) of 8.32% and 11.89% 
in no spoof and spoof cases, while our method achieves 0.27% and 2.12%. Apparently, 
the proposed method helps to increase the spoofing resistance of multimodal systems.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss the approaches to 
verification based on one-to-many match, and we review the existing methods using 
sparse coding in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the sparsity-based affinity and 
recognition measures, together with the proposed multimodal verification system. In 
Section 4, we describe our chimeric multimodal database and report the corresponding 
experimental results. The conclusion is drawn in Section 5. 
2 Related Work 
In a biometric verification system, an individual who desires to be recognized claims 
an identity and presents biometric samples. Then the system conducts a comparison to 
determine whether the claim is licit or not. Verification is used for positive recognition, 
where the aim is to prevent multiple people from using the same identity. 
Typically, biometric verification systems conduct a one-to-one match that compares 
a query image against the gallery template(s), whose identity is being claimed. The 
comparison produces a similarity score. The system accepts the claim if the score is 
higher than an operating threshold, otherwise rejects it. The operating threshold is de-
termined in the training phase based on the genuine and imposter score distributions. 
However, it is unlikely to collect all the representative samples of a client that cover all 
possible variations, for example, expression, pose, illumination, aging, and occlusion 
in face. Under such circumstances, it cannot be guaranteed that no imposter score is 
higher than the predefined operating threshold. The system is at a risk of being cracked 
by intruders. Therefore, the one-to-one match solely based on a predetermined operat-
ing threshold is problematic. 
Two decades ago, Verlinde et al. [11] proposed a one-to-many match biometric ver-
ification method using a k-NN classifier. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of 
the first attempts to consider non-target subjects for verification in the test phase. Nev-
ertheless, the inferior comparison algorithm like k-NN could probably account for the 
rare use of one-to-many match in verification. Cohort-based score normalization also 
takes advantage of non-target subjects but serves the traditional one-to-one match ver-
ification [12]. In recent years, we have witnessed the great success of sparse coding 
techniques in biometric recognition [13-15]. The sparse representation-based classifi-
cation (SRC) conducts one-to-many comparisons in a sparse coding procedure and is 
naturally applicable to biometric identification. Note that, along with the initial research 
of SRC-based face identification in [13], a metric called sparse concentration index 
(SCI) was applied to reject outliers, i.e. the subjects who do not appear in dictionary. 
Inspired by the success of SRC identification and sparsity-based outlier verification, 
SRC-based comparison has been introduced in speaker verification. In [16], GMM 
mean supervector is used as feature of an utterance. The L1-norm value of the represen-
tation coefficients associated with the claimed identity is used as genuine score, while 
the L1-norm of the coefficients of each other non-target subject are imposter scores. 
Based on a similar idea, Li et al. [17] created the dictionary using the total variability i-
vectors and evaluated three sparsity-based measures for speaker verification, which 
achieved better results than a SVM baseline. 
3 The Proposed Method 
3.1 Affinity metric 
In this section, we present a representation-based measure to gauge the affinity of a 
query sample to a claimed client, based on the assumption that a biometric sample 
would result in inferior sparse representation fidelity if it doesn’t lie in the subspace 
spanned by the samples from the same subject [8, 9]. Note that, it is unlikely to ex-
haustively collect the representative samples per subject to construct a class specific 
overcomplete dictionary. A feasible way is to use non-target subjects to collaboratively 
represent the query samples [18].  
Therefore, we select a number of non-target subjects together with the claimed client. 
Their gallery samples/features are used to construct an over-complete dictionary 
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samples of non-target subjects. Without any specific instructions, bA is fixed for all 
identity verification processes. Given a query sample y , if it is from a genuine client 
and isn’t of inferior quality, y  should lie in a subspace spanned by cA . In this context, 
y  can be sparsely represented by y = Aα with high fidelity (see the genuine distribu-
tion in Fig. 1), where NRα  is the coefficient vector. A sparse solution of α  can be 
obtained by the following optimization problem [13]: 
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 In a partial spoof attack, a query sample of non-spoofed modalities is unlikely to lie 
in any subspace spanned by the dictionary samples given that the non-target subjects 
are confidential. In this context, only a solution with inferior collaborative representa-
tion fidelity (CRF), described in Eq. (2), can be found by optimizing Eq. (1). 
( )
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(a) Face distribution in ear spoof case                 (b) Ear distribution in face spoof case 
Fig. 1. CRF distributions in partial spoof attacks. 
Fig.1 shows the CRF distributions on a chimeric multimodal database using face and 
ear, detailed in Section 4. When the ear of a client is spoofed, the intruder needs to show 
his/her face or an arbitrary face to complete the biometric data enrollment. Such arbi-
trary face is unlikely to be from the non-target subjects since the combination of the 
overcomplete dictionary is confidential. In this context, the non-spoofed face is an out-
lier that does not lie in the subspace spanned by A and hence leads to an inferior CRF 
score, see in Fig. 1(a). When the face is spoofed, we see similar CRF distribution of the 
non-spoofed ears in Fig. 1(b). From the perspective of the client, CRF score can be used 
to represent the affinity of the query sample to it. 
 
3.2 Sparsity-based recognition scores 
We consider sparse coding as a competing comparison among the client and non-target 
subjects, and hence explore other two sparsity-based measures, namely, sparse coding 
error (SCE) and sparse contribution rate (SCR), for multimodal verification. 
Since αˆ  is achieved in Eq. (1), the SCE value is calculated by 
( ) ( )
2
ˆ
c cE = −y y A α ,                   (3) 
where c : 
N NR R→  is the characteristic function that selects the coefficients associ-
ated with the claimed client. 
The well-known SRC and most of its extensions identify a query sample based on 
comparing the SCEs of all classes in dictionary. Their superior classification perfor-
mance validates that SCE is a good candidate to measure the correlation between a 
query sample and a specific class, as a distance score. Thus, it is reasonable to use SCE 
for verification. 
Wright et al. [13] presented a metric called sparse concentration index (SCI) to reject 
outliers in face identification. Essentially, the SCI value depends on the class who con-
tributes the most in sparse coding. Given a query sample that isn’t an outlier, it gener-
ally belongs to the class with the maximal sparse contribution rate (SCR), as defined in 
Eq. (4). A large value of SCR obtained by a class indicates a greater possibility of the 
query sample belonging to this class. Therefore, SCR could possibly be used as a sim-
ilarity score for verification. 
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Fig. 2. The distributions of SCE and SCR with Sum fusion on our multimodal dataset. 
Fig. 2 plots the distributions of SCE and SCR scores obtained on the proposed chi-
meric multimodal database of face and ear. For convenience to illustrate the effective-
ness of SCE and SCR in multimodal verification, we use the Sum rule to fuse face and 
ear scores. As for SCE, the distribution centers of the genuine and imposter scores are 
far away from each other with little overlap. Although there is no a clear distribution 
center peak of the genuine SCR, the overlap is not evident as well. More experimental 
evidence supporting SCE and SCR is shown in Section 4. In addition, Fig. 2 also 
demonstrates that most spoof scores are located between the distribution centers of gen-
uine and imposter scores. This implies that the multimodal fusion methods based on 
SCE or SCR are vulnerable to spoof attacks. 
Some variants of SCE and SCR have been used in speaker verification and shown 
to achieve comparable performance with the traditional one-to-one verification. How-
ever, in our face and ear unimodal experiments, a genuine client might lose his/her 
chance to obtain an eligible SCE or SCR score in the competing comparison, owing to 
the variations in query samples. If it happens, the genuine score will be extremely low. 
It means that many licitly claimed clients could not pass the verification system by 
tuning a client specific operating threshold. Instead, more user cooperation will be nec-
essary, which would degrade the user experience. Therefore, for high accuracy and user 
convenience of identity verification, sparsity-based one-to-many comparisons would 
be rather preferable in multimodal scenarios rather than in unimodal applications.   
 3.3 Multimodal Verification 
The CRF score that measures the affinity of a query sample to its claimed client can be 
utilized to enhance the system’s resistance to partial spoof attacks in a serial or parallel 
fusion mode. In a serial fusion mode, multimodal systems firstly examine the CRF 
scores of each modality to determine whether they are spoofed or not, and then conduct 
multimodal verification.  
However, as shown in Fig. 1, the overlap of the genuine and the spoof CRF score 
distribution is still rather obvious. A hard CRF threshold would lead to high false ac-
ceptance rate (FAR), while a loose one may compromise crack the multimodal system. 
Furthermore, there is a high possibility that the non-spoofed modalities get inferior 
recognition scores along with inferior CRF scores from the same sparse coding. The 
CRF score and sparsity-based recognition score are complementary. Hence, it is worth-
while to combine them in a parallel way to achieve better performance. 
 
 
Fig. 3. An overview of the multimodal system architecture. 
Two sparsity-based recognition scores, i.e., SCE and SCR, are introduced in Section 
3.2. Both the Sum fusion methods based on them get promising verification perfor-
mance in zero effort attempts, as shown by the distributions in Fig. 2. These results 
support the use of the sparsity-based one-to-many comparison in multimodal systems. 
On the other hand, SCR is much more inferior to SCE in spoof attacks. The detailed 
experimental results will be given in Section 4. 
Last, we select the SCE and CRF scores of each modality to form a score vector for 
a verification claim. Suppose there are K modalities, ke  and kf  are the SCE and CRF 
scores of the kth modality. The final score vector can be denoted by 
1 1 2 2( , , , , , , )K KS e f e f e f = . In the training phase, we use genuine, imposter, and spoof 
score samples to train a SVM classifier with RBF kernel. For simplicity but without the 
loss of generality, an overview of system architecture with two modalities (K=2) is 
shown in Fig. 3 to illustrate the proposed method. 
The chimeric multimodal database introduced in Section 4 contains 79 subjects with 
7 gallery samples each. All these samples are used to form an overcomplete dictionary 
with 553 atoms. We don’t have abundance data to discuss how to optimally select the 
non-target subjects in this paper. Note that, we ignore the issue of score normalization, 
given that the scores of face and ear are compatible in our experiments.   
4 Experiments and Discussion 
4.1 Databases 
The proposed method is general for verification using multiple biometric traits. In this 
paper, we construct a chimeric multimodal database with publicly available face and 
ear databases. All the 79 subjects in USTB III ear database [19] are randomly paired 
with the first 79 subjects of AR face database [20]. For each subject, the 7 face images 
without occlusion of Session 1 are used as gallery samples, while the same type of 7 
images of Session 2 are used as probe samples. The USTB III is a multi-view ear data-
base with 20 images per subject. We use the same gallery and probe partition rule in [8, 
9], where 7 ear gallery images and 13 ear probe images are selected for each subject. 
In our experiments, the 2 probe images per subject with extreme pose variation are 
discarded. For each subject on the multimodal database, in the gallery set, 7 face images 
are uniquely paired with the 7 ear images to form 79×7=553 multimodal samples. In 
the probe set, each face image is paired with all the ear images to form 79×7×11=6083 
multimodal samples. 
To simulate the worst-case partial spoof attacks, in a face spoof case, we replace the 
ear part of a multimodal sample with the image of USTB II ear database (77 subjects, 
4 images per subject) [19], In an ear spoof case, we replace the face part with the image 
of Georgia Tech face database (GT, 50 subjects, 8 images per subject) [21]. Finally, we 
get 77 subjects, 28 face spoof multimodal samples per subject, and 50 subjects, 88 ear 
spoof multimodal samples per subject.  
In the experiments, we use the features of gallery samples of all 79 subjects to con-
struct the overcomplete dictionary. The SCE, SCR, and CRF scores are derived from 
the comparison between one-sample and one-set. The numbers of genuine, imposter 
and spoof score samples are 6083, 474474 (6083×78), and 6556, respectively. As for 
the competing methods using cosine similarity, we empirically select the best match 
score from each comparison, hence their score sample numbers are the same. 
4.2 Settings 
The 2D-DCT method is applied for feature extraction of face and ear images, since it 
is fast, general, and without specific training. The DCT coefficients are scanned in a 
 zigzag manner starting from the top-left corner of the entire transformed image to form 
a feature vector with 200 dimensions.  
The proposed multimodal method uses SVM with RBF kernel (sigma=0.25). It is 
compared with the Sum fusion methods of SCE and SCR, denoted by SUM(sce) and 
SUM(scr), respectively. The competing multimodal methods include the well-known 
LLR [22], SVM [23], and Sum fusion methods, which use cosine similarity and are 
respectively denoted by LLR(cos), SVM(cos), and SUM(cos). SVM(cos) also uses 
RBF kernel (sigma=1). 
Without specific instructions, half of the genuine, imposter and spoof scores are ran-
domly selected for training, and the remainder are for testing. To alleviate the imbal-
ance of training samples, SVM-based classifiers use 1/10 imposters to train. The 
LLR(cos) uses half of all kinds of samples to fit Gaussian mixture models for score 
distribution estimation. We run all experiments 5 times, the results presented here are 
based on the average from these 5 runs. 
4.3 Results 
The metrics like false acceptance rate (FAR), false rejection rate (FRR), equal error rate 
(EER), and the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are generally used to 
evaluate methods in regular verification. The spoof FAR (SFAR) is specifically used 
to note the FAR in spoof attacks. 
In the first part of the experiments, we train all the learning-based classifiers without 
considering the spoof samples, namely no spoof training. Fig. 4 plots the ROC curves 
of all competing methods in regular verification. The methods with sparsity-based met-
rics are observed to be significantly better than the methods with traditional metric. 
Among the former methods, SUM(scr) is obviously inferior to SUM(sce) and the pro-
posed method. The ROC curves and the EERs summarized in Table 1 do not show 
evident advantage of our method when compared with SUM(sce). 
Table 1. Performance in terms of EER (%). 
Training Testing SUM(cos) SVM(cos) LLR(cos) SUM(sce) SUM(scr) Ours 
Genuine 
Imposter 
Regular 11.83 6.632 6.85 0.20 0.39 0.18 
Spoof attacks 12.44 22.05 21.04 8.73 28.26 4.13 
Genuine 
Imposter 
Spoof 
Regular 11.83 8.79 8.32 0.20 0.39 0.27 
Spoof attacks 12.44 11.89 12 8.73 28.26 2.12 
 
Fig.5(a) demonstrates that all these methods without spoof training are vulnerable to 
partial spoof attacks. Both the EERs of LLR(cos) and SVM(cos) increase by about 
15%, and even that of SUM(scr) soars to 28.26%. On the other hand, our method 
achieves a 4.13% EER, which is less than half of the second best. 
In the second part of the experiments, all the learning-based classifiers are trained 
with genuine, imposter and spoof samples, namely spoof training. We can see from 
Table 1 that, compared with the former experiments of spoof attacks, both LLR(cos) 
and SVM(cos) get about 10% improvements, while the EER of ours reduces by half, 
down to 2.12%. The overwhelming advantage of our method can be seen vividly with 
the ROC curves plotted in Fig. 5(b). It is quite promising provided that the experiments 
here are in the worst-case spoof conditions where the fake score distribution of the 
spoofed modalities is identical to that of genuine. 
 
Fig. 4. Performance in regular verification. 
 
(a) No spoof training.                          (b) Spoof training. 
Fig. 5. Performance in partial spoof attacks. 
Although LLR(cos) and SVM(cos) also exhibit obvious improvements, they encoun-
ter obvious accuracy decline in regular verification, see Table 1. These results show 
again that the spoof training may bring about unacceptable performance degradation in 
regular identity verification [2]. As for the proposed method, the EER increases from 
0.18% to 0.27%, which is still very low. Above all, the proposed method is able to 
achieve very low EER in both regular verification and partial spoof attacks. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, aiming to improve the multimodal system’s resistance to partial spoof 
attacks, we proposed the use of collaborative representation fidelity with non-target 
 subjects to measure the affinity of a query sample to a claimed client. We further con-
sidered sparse coding as a competing comparison among the claimed client and non-
target subjects, and hence explored two sparsity-based measures associated with indi-
vidual subjects for recognition. The encouraging performance evidently supports the 
use of sparsity-based one-to-many comparisons in multimodal systems. However, 
based on their performance in spoof attacks, only the representation-based one is se-
lected as recognition score. Last, two types of representation-based scores for each mo-
dality are assembled to train a SVM classifier. 
The proposed method was compared with well-known multimodal methods like 
LLR, SVM, and Sum fusion methods, using the cosine similarity measure, on a chi-
meric multimodal database of face and ear traits. The experimental results demonstrate 
that in both regular verification and partial spoof attacks, the proposed method over-
whelmingly outperforms its competitors. The proposed method is a general model for 
combining multiple biometric traits. In the future work, we plan to evaluated with more 
biometric traits like palmprint, iris, and with real spoofed data. We believe the method 
can be further enhanced by using more robust feature extraction method like CNN-
based, and advanced multimodal joint sparse coding techniques [24]. 
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